Glasnost and the Baltic States

The Baltic Republics (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) were the first Soviet republics to embrace the open political forum that glasnost created. This was because of their prior independence and strong national identities. Incorporated forcefully into the USSR as a result of Stalin’s 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Baltic States suffered from years of deportations and the suppression of national identity. To consolidate control over all three Baltic States, Stalin in 1941 ordered mass deportations of threatening groups including non-communist leaders and wealthy capitalists. Over four nights, 35,000 people were taken away from Lithuania alone. This resulted in significant discontent and national grievances from the Baltic populace. However, these secessionist sentiments lingered on the periphery of the three Baltic States because demands for national autonomy or criticism of Soviet actions such as Russification were seen as anti-Soviet.  These behaviors were punishable by long prison terms or by exile. As such, Soviet rule had come to be seen as an unalterable fact of life and a permanent state of affairs.

Glasnost upended this system and provided a platform for these suppressed grievances and secessionist sentiments to make their way into the national consciousness. When glasnost first began in late 1986 and early 1987, it contained no strong nationalist component. As an Estonian sociologist later presciently observed, “neither its chief architects nor the broad public were prepared for the possible rise of national movements.” However, with the growing atmosphere of press freedom and narratives challenging the postulates of Marxism and what the regime had hidden came to light, the Baltic populace began to question Soviet narratives and focused on uncovering the Stalinist past. Specifically, in Lithuania after 1987, between 150-200 letters were received daily at the Institute for Philosophy, Sociology and Justice about grievances from Stalin’s mass deportations. 

Motivated by historical grievances about Stalin’s brutality, nationalist movements in the Baltic States gained momentum as these issues were publicly acknowledged. These grievances became rallying points for national movements seeking autonomy. The opening up of Soviet history ignited decades of pent up anger, national ethnic humiliation, and an early desire for self-determination. The Soviet populace began to question the legitimacy of the state that they had been forced to follow. This was a major contradiction with Gorbachev’s initial goal: glasnost inadvertently increased resentment towards the government as opposed to increasing trust in the bureaucracy. 

Paradoxically, the reason why nationalist movements were able to gain momentum is because glasnost made public assembly possible, leading to larger and more frequent demonstrations. Prior to glasnost, protests were rare and closely monitored by the Soviet state. The first wave of protests in the Baltics (~1986) revolved around environmental concerns (including protests against nuclear power, water pollution). Environmental concerns were harder to suppress as they affected public health as opposed to concerns that directly challenged Soviet rule. Even in an authoritarian state, public health was a fundamental human right—the populace did not want to be exposed to nuclear waste and dirty water. Poor environmental regulations would rightfully foment the anger of the people. Historian Olga King articulates that the reason why the environmental movement was the first to surface stems from the fact that Soviet authorities did not perceive it as relatively harmful.

These environmental protests were at the center of the initial creation of grassroots activist movements that later led to nationalist secessionist movements on two fronts. First, environmental concerns shed concerns about broader Soviet governance. The Soviet Union prioritized industrial development over ecological safety: glasnost allowed suppressed information about environmental disasters to surface. As a result of the systemic policies that resulted in these environmental concerns, the Soviet people began to see the connection between environmental degradation and the systemic flaws of the Soviet regime which led to larger protests about the issues pervading the system. In the Eastern bloc, similar environmental movements were occurring which became a gateway for political dissent. For example, early protests about environmentalism in Czechoslovakia focused solely on environmental conservation and avoided political criticism. Soon, dissident groups connected environmental degradation as a failure of the Communist regime. Environmental issues were framed as a violation of human rights and a consequence of the USSR’s structural flaws. Second, the lack of response to the environmental protests emboldened more activists; people realized that they could criticize the government without immediate repression, which is why they began to test the boundaries of permissible dissent. This emboldenment of activists paved the way for more radical opposition movements which ultimately undermined the Soviet Union, a major contradiction from glasnost’s initial goal. These seemingly apolitical environmental protests fomented the second wave of protests. 

The January 1987 Plenum and the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution were significant inflection points in the development of protests as a result of glasnost. Coupled with the success of environmental protests, the plenum’s exposé about Stalinist grievances resulted in the shift from environmental concerns to nationalist mobilization. This is why, by Spring of 1987, small groups of hippies, ecologists, Jewish refuseniks, Russian nationalists and Baltic dissidents tested permissible boundaries by engaging in small-scale demonstrations in the Baltics.

Mass protests in Latvia and Estonia on the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Stalin’s treaty that put the Baltics under the Soviet sphere of influence) occurred in 1987. As a result of glasnost, Soviet authorities granted permits for the rallies, which was a precedent setting show of solicitude in a region where Moscow kept close vigilance against nationalist sentiment. Describing one of the protests, Ints Calitis, a Latvian dissident, said “The atmosphere at today’s rally was exciting. The statements made against the Hitler-Stalin pact were sharp and strong. In a way, it was a triumph of the position of the people over the authorities.” Calitis was not alone — Janis Shkapars, a protestor, described the protests saying, “I am afraid. There is too much euphoria. We are in a revolutionary situation.” Occurring throughout 1987 and 1988, these protests demonstrated the Soviet populace’s disillusionment with the Soviet government and were a huge exertion of Baltic self-determination, which undermined Gorbachev’s goal of Soviet unity. These demonstrations laid the groundwork for protests in the future. Eve Parnastate, an Estonian activist said “The first step has been accomplished. They are already conceding that there was an occupation in Estonia 40 years ago.”

The success of these initial demonstrations encouraged activists to create larger, broader, and more organized political movements which were called the Popular Fronts. The Popular Fronts brought together diverse groups who realized the need for a formal structure to coordinate actions and amplify their demands. Through the formation of these organizations, the protests shifted from spontaneous acts of resistance to coherent and organized political movements. All three Popular Fronts presented autonomic demands for economies to be self governing, languages to have official status, and commemoration for the victims of Stalin’s crimes. 

The first Popular Front that formed was on April 13, 1988 in Estonia by Edgar Savisaar, when he appeared on television and called for the formation of a mass movement to press from below for the democratization that Gorbachev was promising from above. He immediately received thousands of letters of support, which allowed him to establish a formal founding Congress for the Popular Front of Estonia at the start of October 1988. Inspired by Savisaar’s idea of creating a unified movement, the idea was soon taken up in Latvia and Lithuania. In Lithuania, the creation of their Popular Front began in June 1988 when intellectuals, who were excited by news of developments in Estonia, elected a committee of thirty-five people called the Initiative Group of the Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania, or ‘Sajudis’ for short. Sajudis grew rapidly, organizing meetings and demonstrations throughout Lithuania. In October 1988, the Sajudis held their founding congress, attended by over 1,000 delegates, and elected to adopt a program advocating for greater autonomy, cultural revival, and democratization. Similarly, in Latvia, the Popular Front was officially founded when intellectuals, activists, environmentalists, and reformists convened to establish a structured political organization that advocated for Latvian independence.

The 1988 and 1989 elections were pivotal in the history of the Popular Fronts, as they gained many seats in the Parliament, securing local power and legitimizing pro-independence movements in the Baltic States. These electoral victories gave the Popular Fronts more legitimacy within the government, and also served as a mechanism to challenge Soviet rule from within the system. In doing so, these states were able to call for real autonomy and independence which ultimately contradicted Gorbachev’s goal of unity. As a result of their electoral successes, Baltic popular movements were able to enjoy almost unlimited access to official facilities, including meeting halls, offices, and printing presses that previously were only available to official groups that were closely monitored by the party.

Perhaps the most significant inflection point in the development of the Popular Fronts was the organization of the “Baltic Way” in 1989: a human chain that stretched from Tallinn in Estonia to Vilnius in Lithuania. In a gargantuan, globally televised spectacle, over 2 million people linked hands and created a 430-mile linkage to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and objection to Soviet rule. In organizing the protests, Estonian activist Marju Laruristin articulated that the protests served as a mechanism for the Baltics to “regain our freedom so that our children can live in a free country”.  Rhetoric during the protests was harshly anti-Soviet and in full support of the autonomy for the Baltic States. Protestors chanted “freedom, freedom”, waving banners and placards that read: We Do Not Want To Live In A Totalitarian Empire, and Down With The Russian Empire. Other anti-Soviet posters on display at the rally likened the Soviet Communist regime to Nazi Germany; slogans shouted included “The Soviet occupation army must go home” and “the free world cannot stand by any longer”. Describing the protests, Heinz Valk, a protestor, declared that “We are proclaiming to each other and to the whole world that we in the Baltic nations have never given up our freedom.” The Baltic Way’s biggest achievement was inducing the Soviet Union to admit to its past crimes including acknowledging the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The success and scale of these protests gained major news coverage worldwide, launching the Popular Fronts into the spotlight which built international sympathy for Baltic sovereignty; this attention also put international pressure on the Soviet Union by exposing its repressive history. 

As the Popular Fronts gained momentum, the Baltic republics issued declarations of sovereignty, moving to diminish the Central Party’s power. Lithuania proclaimed the reconstitution of its independence on March 11, 1990, followed by Estonia’s proclamation that Soviet power was illegal in Estonia and that a transition period must ensue to restore an independent Republic on March 30, 1990. Two months later, on May 4, 1990, Latvia declared that their annexation to the USSR was illegal. These bold calls for secession were a reflection of the newfound space for political dissent and national self-expression made possible by glasnost. 

The Baltic States’ declarations of independence had a transformative spillover effect to other states that proved catastrophic to the Kremlin; they served as an ominous and swift impetus to legislators in other republics to draft their own acts of sovereignty adapted to local circumstances. If the Baltics could get away with declaring sovereignty and millions of them could hold hands across all three states in favor of independence, why should other Soviet republics not be expected to press their own claims for popular sovereignty against their repressive, Kremlin-controlled regimes? Thus, by the end of 1990, 14 of the 15 Union republics had calls for sovereignty, inspired by the Baltic model. What had begun as a regional challenge to Soviet control in the Baltics had snowballed into a broader separatist wave: the possibility of the dissolution of the Soviet Union began to loom large and imminent. 

Faced with the disintegration of central authority as a result of these nationalist movements, Soviet leaders responded with force. In contrast to Gorbachev’s restraint in 1986-87 at glasnost’s inception, Soviet authorities in January 1991 cracked down in Lithuania and Latvia, killing and wounding scores of unarmed civilians. On January 13, 1991, Soviet troops attacked communications centers in the Lithuanian capital, killing 15 unarmed civilians. On January 20, troops and police units similarly attacked the Interior Ministry in Riga, Latvia, killing four civilians. The same day, multiple explosions occurred in Tallinn, Estonia, as local pro-Moscow forces sought to create the impression of impending chaos. This violence in the three Baltic States backfired, as glasnost-enabled media such as Lithuania’s Sajudis publications and Latvia’s Atmoda, alongside Western broadcasts, amplified the brutality of the Soviet crackdown, which galvanized the Baltic populace. Baltic citizens formed human barricades around government buildings to protest Soviet violence during the crackdowns; a militaristic storming of these parliaments would seriously damage Gorbachev’s international reputation, which is why Soviet forces refrained from escalating the crackdown further.  These events only strengthened the Baltic people’s unwavering resolve to seek full independence from the Soviet Union, undermining Gorbachev’s goal of a reformed Union. What would follow over the next 11 months would be a precipitous avalanche of blazingly fast events that would lead to the staggering fall of the Soviet Union. 

As a result of the failures of these violent crackdowns and increased secessionist sentiment, Gorbachev proposed a Union Treaty on February 6, 1991, offering republics sovereignty while maintaining central control over foreign policy, defense, and taxation. The Baltic States rejected the treaty because it did not give them enough autonomy. In response to the newly proposed treaty, on February 9, 1991, Lithuania put the question of independence to a popular vote and 90% supported independence. On March 3rd, the Estonians and Latvians did the same thing with 79% and 74% respectively supporting independence. These referendums, organized by the Baltic Popular Fronts, were a direct affront to Gorbachev’s authority; anti-Soviet sentiment from glasnost had resulted in irrevocable demands for autonomy. 

On the eve of August 18, 1991, nine republics were preparing to sign a revised version of the Union Treaty. Unlike the initial version from February, which retained centralized control over key areas like taxation, this August draft would have deprived Moscow of most of its economic power over the republics, giving them significant autonomy to govern themselves. As Union stability was crumbling, the prospect of this treaty triggered a coup attempt as a last-ditch attempt to preserve centralized Soviet power. On August 19th, an eight-man junta of Soviet hardliners announced that they were assuming power. They placed Gorbachev (who was vacationing in Crimea) under house arrest, claiming that he was ill and unable to govern. To reverse the liberalization from Gorbachev’s reforms, they banned demonstrations, closed newspapers, and outlawed political parties. The attempt of the hardliners to seize power only lasted three days: Boris Yeltsin, the recently elected president of Russia, emerged as a leader of the growing resistance against Gorbachev. When the hardliners sent troops to besiege the Russian parliament, a crowd of 100,000 people were gathered to defend Boris Yeltsin and his government. 

Not only was the desperate and destabilizing coup a failure, it discredited the central Soviet government and the Communist Party which catalyzed the dissolution of the once fearsome nation in a few months. When Gorbachev returned to Moscow after the coup to continue his position as General Secretary, he was “rendered virtually powerless by the changed political context.” Trying to piece the Soviet Union back together, Gorbachev argued that there would be dire consequences if the Soviet republics refused to agree to a new federal structure. He produced further diluted versions of the Union Treaty which aimed to limit the Soviet central government’s functions to solely defense, foreign policy, transportation, environmental regulation, and human rights, while giving republics autonomy over all other functions. The Soviet republics, empowered by the political aperture that glasnost offered, no longer saw reform as sufficient: they demanded full independence. Gorbachev also attempted to salvage a Union of Sovereign States, which never materialized due to its lack of formal ratification. Gorbachev’s ideas for a renewed Union were no longer viable because glasnost had legitimized national self-determination calls from the Soviet republics. 

The republics’ rejection of Gorbachev’s federal structure resulted in an even further shift towards independence. Inspired by the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia, and Turkmenistan all held referendums in which majorities voted for independence. However, the most decisive turning point was the Ukrainian election on December 1, 1991, where over 90% of voters supported independence. Emboldened by Ukraine’s secessionist stance, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus shortly thereafter signed the Minsk Declaration, which established a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that would serve as a successor to the USSR. Glasnost’s political platform enabled this shift because public discourse and nationalist mobilization faced little central resistance. This declaration was ratified by the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1991. Shocking in its unceremonious descent, the USSR formally dissolved when eleven republics signed the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21st, which formalized the CIS and agreed to the “dissolution of the USSR”. Four days later—on December 25th—Gorbachev resigned as the General Secretary of the Soviet Union. The Soviet flag ceased to fly over the Kremlin, marking the definitive end of the USSR and the end to the 50-year Cold War: an outcome fueled directly by glasnost. 

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