The Suez Canal: A Major Cold War Battleground

The history of the Suez Canal’s founding is tied to its emergence as a focal point for Cold War rivalries. Since the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, it has been an economically important trade route, shortening the travel distance between Europe and Asia and providing Western countries quicker access to their colonial holdings in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. As a result, the canal became a major point of geopolitical interest, entrenched in British and French colonial power. In 1854, Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps arrived in Egypt and advocated for the construction of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Company was thus formed, which by 1882, became majority owned by France and England due to the sale of Egypt’s founding 44% stake to Britain. This founding history set the stage for decades of tension surrounding the canal, as control over it became a symbol of economic and political power in the region. In 1956, the US contemplated investing in the Aswan High Dam to thwart the USSR’s growing influence but rejected doing so due to Egyptian President Nasser’s unfavorable policies towards the United States. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which provoked Britain, France, and Israel to invade Egypt, seeking to regain control over it. This crisis demonstrated the interplay of powers once past (France and UK), emerging nations (Egypt), and the fight between the USSR and the US for dominance on the global stage. As former colonial powers struggled to maintain control while formerly colonized nations began to assert their sovereignty, the Suez Crisis highlighted conflicting goals between Egypt, who sought unilateral control of the Suez Canal to assert political independence, and the UK and France, who advocated for international control to uphold their economic goals and to preserve their colonial power. At the same time, the US and USSR both leveraged the crisis to build alliances to contain the other, highlighting their broader Cold War objective of geopolitical dominance even as they cooperated to de-escalate the crisis. 

The Suez Crisis came during a dynamic period of decolonization, whereby countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East began to break away from colonial powers. This period of decolonization opened a plethora of opportunities for the US and USSR to compete for influence and build alliances with newly sovereign nations as a means of expanding their geopolitical and ideological influence. The Bandung Conference in 1955 was the first large-scale meeting of Asian and African nations, most of which had recently gained independence from colonial rule. The Bandung Communique codified sovereign principles such as “self-determination”, resistance that colonialism must be “speedily brought to an end”, and also advocated for decolonized nations to adopt a policy of nonalignment. Among these decolonization movements, Egyptian President Nasser was a major advocate for Egyptian sovereignty and a loud evangelist of Pan-Arab philosophy, arguing that the Arab people were one, and thus needed a cohesive policy to combat Zionism and Western imperialism. One of the most striking examples of Nasser’s pro-independence vision was his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, a move that embodied the principles of self-determination from the Bandung Conference. 

By nationalizing the Suez Canal, Egypt aimed to assert its sovereignty and secure economic autonomy, but also solidified its emergence as a major player in Africa by outmaneuvering a declining France and Britain. Announcing Egypt’s decision to nationalize the canal, Egyptian President Nasser said, “We shall eradicate [the past] by restoring our rights in the Suez Canal. [...] We shall not let imperialists or exploiters dominate us. We shall not let history repeat itself once more. We have gone forward to build a strong Egypt. We go forward towards political and economic independence." By asserting that Egypt would no longer allow “imperialists or exploiters” to dominate it, Nasser framed nationalization as part of a larger struggle for autonomy, exemplifying the tenets of the Bandung Conference and echoing a push among many nations to break free from colonial influence. To consummate its economic autonomy, Egypt refused to accept the imposition of any kind of internationalization of the canal; Egypt would only share rights to the canal with the international community insofar as it was to its benefit. In so doing, Egypt was able to turn the tables on France and England after a century of their usurpation of the canal, allowing Egypt to build economic power and become independent from Western powers. Moreover, this move demonstrated Egypt’s role as an emerging major power on the global stage; it set economic terms for the canal that the rest of the world had to follow. For these reasons, Nasser declared that nationalization of the canal would allow for Egypt to achieve “true sovereignty, true dignity, and true pride”.

Egypt’s economic maneuvering was matched by its strategic political prowess on the global stage through its position of nonalignment. When France, Israel, and the UK invaded Egypt, Nasser masterfully played the US and USSR off of each other by leveraging their Cold War tensions. After Israel launched a surprise attack, Nasser initially appealed to the USSR for support, because he predicted that the USSR would serve as a potential counterweight to Western military action. The USSR declined Nasser’s request because it was wary of provoking a wider confrontation and was bogged down by an existential crisis in Hungary. By applying the same calculation of political maneuvering, Nasser approached the US to request military assistance. By leveraging nonalignment—the refusal to side with either the US or USSR—Nasser was able to get concessions from both nations in Egypt’s favor. Ultimately, Nasser’s strategy succeeded, as he swayed the US to intervene which ousted France, Britain, and Israel with a United Nations force.  This was a huge exertion of Egyptian agency and power; a nonaligned nation was able to exert influence over two superpowers to protect its sovereignty and strategic interests. However, Egypt’s nationalization of the canal was a powerful blow that threatened the interests of former imperial powers Britain and France, which is why they called for the canal’s internationalization. 

France sought to maintain international control over the Suez Canal due to its economic interests and its founding historical claim to it. France described its economy as “linked to the life of the canal”, sending 12 million tons of oil in 1955 through the canal. Nationalization of the canal threatened France’s role in overseeing operations, jeopardizing its ability to control shipping fees and the prices of goods passing through the canal. While Nasser assured the international community that Egypt would guarantee the free circulation of all ships on the canal at normal rates, France was skeptical towards these promises in light of Egypt’s hostile rhetoric toward Western powers. Thus, France argued that Egypt should “entrust [...] an international authority, the management of the canal” to maintain favorable shipping and economic conditions. To justify international intervention, French officials invoked their historical legacy, emphasizing that the French people had played a key role in ideating, financing, and managing the canal for 87 years, entitling them to a voice in the canal’s future. Nationalization did not only thwart France’s economic interests, but it was a direct affront to its historical, near century long stewardship of the canal.

Similarly, the UK advocated for international control of the canal to uphold its economic interests and maintain its vast regional influence, especially as decolonization threatened British imperial power. The British characterized the Suez Canal as the “swing door of the British empire”; it was a strategic asset to the British Empire as it provided a maritime route that connected Britain to its colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The West also depended very heavily on the canal for the shipping of oil. Britain’s access to its colonial holdings and economic independence on the canal were crucial in maintaining British status as a global power; nationalization threatened British imperial power by making it harder for Britain to access its imperial possessions. However, British frustration was exacerbated by Egypt’s growing resistance to British rule which culminated in Nasser’s nationalization of the canal in 1956. Some flashpoints of the decline of British influence in the region included Egyptian President Naguib el-Nahhas’ revocation of the defense treaty in 1951 that allowed British forces to remain in Egypt and the 1952 coup that overthrew King Farouk, which paved the way for Nasser. British influence was beginning to wane in the region, which made it increasingly reliant on maintaining its influence over the Suez Canal to preserve its economic and political interests. 

To uphold their respective interests, both France and Britain signed the secret Sevres Protocol, commissioning Israel to invade the Sinai Peninsula and advance towards the Suez Canal, a pretext for French and British military intervention. This was effectively a military invasion by France, Britain, and Israel for preservation of their economic and political interests, speciously framed as protecting the Suez from foreign intervention. Furthermore, the invasion highlighted France and Britain’s desperate attempt to maintain imperial power during the wake of decolonization underway in the Cold War. Nonetheless, the failure of the plot was a historically significant turning point, marking the decline of two imperial powers and ascent of a new world order led by the US and USSR. 

While both the US and USSR cooperated to de-escalate the crisis, their cooperation was motivated less by mutual agreement, but instead by self-serving Cold War calculations to strengthen their geopolitical influence. As soon as the crisis began, the USSR was a vocal advocate of Egypt’s nationalization of the canal, condemning British and French violence. As a result, the US was mainly worried that “the USSR might intervene directly, pulling the US into a major conflagration”, one of the reasons why it advocated for de-escalation. Thus, both the US and USSR both voted alongside each other in the United Nations to oppose the tripartite pact. Despite their mutual agreement on de-escalating the conflict, both the US and USSR strategically leveraged the crisis for their respective national goal of strengthening their geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa through alliance building and thwarting the growing political and ideological influence of the other. 

The USSR aimed to weaken the US and Western bloc by supporting Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, portraying itself as the liberator from Western colonialism to build alliances with decolonized states and undermine Western influence in the Middle East and Africa. The USSR believed that the Suez problem could be settled by “respecting the sovereign rights of nations, and by developing international cooperation on a basis of equality and non-interference in internal affairs”, a direct challenge to the British, French, and Israeli proposal of international control. It further criticized such plans as “an attempt to create a stronghold of colonialism”. By openly resisting the Western proposal, the USSR positioned itself as a leader of the anti-imperialist bloc, advocating for principles of non-interference that were codified by the Bandung Communique. This positioning not only strengthened Soviet ideological influence but also deepened Soviet ties with decolonized states seeking independence. In such posturing, the USSR directly condemned the West, saying that “On the one hand [Western governments] recognize the sovereign rights of Egypt; on the other hand, they contest the possibility of Egypt exercising these rights, and thus they are trying to justify interference”. By pointing out the contradiction between the sovereign rights that Western countries supposedly espoused and the West’s actions towards Egypt, the USSR aimed to alienate the West from newly independent states, making it harder for the Western bloc to build alliances. Highlighting the West’s hypocrisy would weaken its credibility, making states more likely to shift towards the Soviet sphere of influence. 

Similarly, the United States sought de-escalation in the Suez Crisis to achieve its larger Cold War goal of Soviet containment through maintaining alliances with Egypt and other Middle Eastern allies. The US’ overarching goal of Soviet containment manifested itself in the leadup to the crisis; while the US withdrew funding from the Aswan Dam, they argued that the decision in no way “reflects or involves any alteration in the friendly relations of the [US and Egypt]”. The US prefaced its withdrawal of funding from the dam in this manner to maintain good relations with Egypt. In doing so, the US aimed to avoid alienating Egypt to prevent it from shifting toward the Soviet sphere of influence, which reflected the US’ broader objective of Soviet containment. Similarly, the US had the same goal of Soviet containment throughout the Suez Crisis, as it sought to counter the spread of communism in newly decolonized states. The USSR could take advantage of widespread anger over the invasion in the Arab world, fomenting the alienation of the West from Middle Eastern allies. Prolonged conflict in the Middle East could thus drive Arab nations closer to the Soviet Union. To counter this threat, the US decided to stop the crisis quickly. The US postured its position when Eisenhower stated, “We do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes. To say this, in this particular instance, is in no way to minimize our friendship with these nations." In this case, the US played a delicate balancing act: it aimed to uphold their Western alliances with Israel, UK, and France, while avoiding the alienation of Middle Eastern allies. By advocating for deescalation, Eisenhower was able to craft a narrative that the United States has “labored tirelessly to bring peace and stability to the [Middle East]”. This allowed for the US to portray itself as a mediator in the Middle East to avoid alienating Egypt and other allies.  By positioning itself as a stable force in the Middle East, the US was able to create an image of itself as a peace-driven power, enhancing its credibility and allowing it to maintain strategic relationships with the West and Middle Eastern powers simultaneously.  

The interplay among the major nations involved in the Suez Crisis revealed the changing global dynamic during the Cold War period. As France and the UK sought to maintain control over the Suez Canal to uphold their economic goals and maintain imperial power, they were outfoxed by Nasser’s nationalization of the canal to assert Egypt’s sovereignty and economic autonomy under a global spotlight. With the decline of former imperial powers, a world order led by the US and USSR became predominant, with both nations cooperating to de-escalate the crisis as a means of winning global influence. The USSR was a vocal advocate of Egypt’s nationalization of the canal, positioning itself as an ally to decolonized states. Similarly, the US deployed a similar strategy of seeking de-escalation to contain the Soviet Union and prevent it from gaining geopolitical strength in the Middle East. Eisenhower played a delicate balancing act where he tried to uphold Western alliances while avoiding the alienation of Middle Eastern allies. These are all testament to the insight that the Cold War—through the lens of the Suez Crisis—entailed significant political calculations from both the US and USSR to gain geopolitical influence. The crisis not only marked the end of imperial power but solidified the emergence of the US and USSR as the world’s two superpowers, which over the next four decades, would bring new battlegrounds all over the world. 

COVER IMAGE - https://www.history.com/articles/suez-crisis